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Abstract—The European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has had a far-reaching impact on data privacy and compliance
for cloud providers. GDPR influences access to, storage, processing and transmission of personal data, requiring these operations to be
verified by a cloud user through explicit consent prior to execution. GDPR rules implemented for such operations can be ambiguous
and often open to interpretation, making manual verification a time consuming and error prone process for cloud providers. An
encoding of GDPR rules is described, with each operation carried out using these rules recorded into a Blockchain for auditing
purposes. Specifically, this work shows how some GDPR rules can appear as opcodes in smart contracts to verify the operations of
providers on user data in a transparent and automatic way. An abstract model is designed to demonstrate how cloud providers can
access and deploy such smart contracts through a Blockchain-based virtual machine. A case study is used to demonstrate how this
approach can be used in practice. The case study uses a collection of design patterns and smart contracts to verify provider
operations, including read, write, execution and transfer on user data. Validation is undertaken by deploying the smart contracts in a
Blockchain test network to investigate the execution costs of GDPR compliance checking.
Index Terms—user privacy, cloud security, blockchain, smart contracts, general data protection regulation
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1 Introduction
Aweb service accessed by a user may utilize a numberof additional externally hosted services across multiple
data centres and providers [14]. Although the user is con-
nected via a web browser to a single end point (web service),
there may be a number of additional services that come
together to offer this capability – often unknown to the user.
Such providers can also increasingly be mobile services at the
network edge. Users of these services transfer their personal
data through a web browser interface without realizing that
the data may be shared among several back-end services. Even
where this data is encrypted during transfer, the first hop
web server needs to decrypt this. By increasing the number
of mobile services and edge resources, a large proportion of
cloud users are voicing misgivings with respect to how privacy
is handled across this cloud service ecosystem, resulting in
limited or no visibility of who has access to data. The General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was introduced to en-
sure that non-expert users can make informed decisions about
their privacy and give informed consent for the use, sharing,
and re-purposing of their personal data [15].
GDPR has been introduced to protect personal data of EU
citizens from privacy breaches. The main elements of GDPR
are: data subject, data controller or joint controller and data
processor. Data subject is directly or indirectly identified
through name, location or IP address. Data controller is a
person or organization specifying the purposes of data pro-
cessing. Data joint controller can be defined where two or more
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controllers jointly determine the purpose of data processing.
Data processor generally acts on the behalf of a controller or
joint controller [16]. Given theses elements, GDPR delegates
the responsibility of any violation in data processing to con-
troller or joint controller, but also gives a shared responsibility
to the processor when a user has no direct control on the
processing steps involved. For instance, according to GDPR
requirements, an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) provider
that supplies user with a managed hosting service will have
the responsibility of processing data produced by its infras-
tructure (e.g. the recording and management of system and
access logs) [15].
Blockchain technology has also been applied in a cloud
environment to enhance user privacy and to provide an audit
trail of providers through a distributed, consensus-based ap-
proach [18]. Cloud applications can make use of Blockchain-
based techniques to enable a user to have control over their
data, and be informed about the types of data processing
that has been carried out by providers [22]. The integration
of GDPR and Blockchain technology enables accountabil-
ity and provenance tracking of operations carried out on
user data [17]. Such an approach relies on the use of au-
ditable smart contracts deployed in a Blockchain, improving
the transparency of personal data usage and processing. A
conceptual architecture was proposed for a privacy-aware
cloud ecosystem that takes advantage of both GDPR and
Blockchain [23].
Although GDPR and Blockchain-based techniques have
been widely used to support immutable transactions on cloud
providers, the verification of GDPR rules relating to opera-
tions carried out by cloud providers over personal data is still
performed manually. Furthermore, the potential of translating
GDPR rules into smart contracts and the automatic detection
of violations (and the actors involved) have received limited
attention. To address these limitations, this paper provides
the following contributions: (i) GDPR rules as opcodes in
2smart contracts to automatically verify the operations of
providers on user data; (ii) defining operations carried out by
providers on personal data during the life cycle of a service;
(iii) an abstract model description to show how providers
can connect to a Blockchain-based virtual machine; (iv) an
algorithm for identifying actors executing non-compliant op-
erations (according to GDPR rules) and violating user consent
obligations; (v) automatic verification of GDPR compliance
using a case study; (vi) experiments demonstrating the po-
tential scalability of the proposed approach, using the gas-
based metric to identify the computational cost of undertaken
GDPR compliance checking.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Sec-
tion 2 presents background and context about Blockchain and
the translation of GDPR rules into pseudo-code. Section 3
proposes a classification scheme that supports the implemen-
tation of GDPR rules as smart contracts and formally defines
the types of operations carried out on user data by providers,
followed by Section 4 describing how smart contracts can be
used for verifying GDPR compliance. An architecture is pro-
posed in which such contracts are accessible to both users and
providers, followed by a description of components that are
used in such an architecture in Section 5. Section 6 presents
a case study expressed as a collection of business processes
– represented using the Business Process Modelling Notation
(BPMN). We annotate the BPMN diagram to describe GDPR
requirements associated with activities and data products
involved in these processes. Section 7 describes experimental
results of our Blockchain-based approach, particularly focus-
ing on the cost of verifying GDPR compliance. Related work
is described in Section 8, with conclusion and future work
provided in Section 9.
2 Background & Context
This section (briefly) describes Blockchain and smart contract
technologies and reviews the translation of GDPR rules into
pseudo-code that can be implemented through smart con-
tracts.
2.1 Blockchain
Blockchain is a decentralized ledger storing a set of records in
blocks, structured as a linked list. Each block uses the hash
address of its previous block, can record a number of transac-
tions and a time stamp showing the creation time of the block.
Users interacting with a Blockchain can access the blocks, but
they cannot change or delete content in the block. Blockchain
contains a network of peer-to-peer nodes called miners, which
can add additional blocks based on a consensus algorithm.
Mining is a key concept of Blockchain through which a block is
created and attached to the Blockchain network [23]. Popular
consensus algorithms proposed for mining are: Proof of Work
(PoW), Proof of Stake (PoS), Proof of Space (PoSpace), Proof
of Importance (PoI), Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance
(PBFT) and Measure of Trust (MoT) – often collectively
referred to as Proof of X (PoX).
Blockchain are categorized into public, federated, or pri-
vate [1]. In a public Blockchain, everyone can participate
and access blocks without permission (e.g. Bitcoin [2] and
Ethereum [12]). A federated Blockchain is operated under
the authority/ engagement of several organizations or groups,
which do not permit any user with access to the Internet to
take part in the verification of transactions (e.g. Corda [3] and
R3 [4]). Finally in a private Blockchain, only one organization
has permission for creating or verifying blocks (e.g. Monax [5]
and Multichain [6]).
The evolution of Blockchain technology is generally classi-
fied across three generations. The first generation is restricted
to cryptocurrency transactions implemented via Bitcoin –
often identified as the first application using a Blockchain.
The second generation enabled users to exchange various
types of assets, ranging from goods to (even) votes. The third
generation introduces “smart contracts” that can be deployed
on the Blockchain network and be checked by users connected
to the network [9]. Smart contracts expand the capabilities
of a Blockchain and enable the integration of Blockchain
techniques into numerous industrial applications.
Smart contracts transform business rules to software code
that can be automatically executed on a Blockchain. The
execution of smart contract is independent of any third party
and the code/script of a contract is recorded in a Blockchain.
A smart contract has a set of transactions, each of which may
change the state of the Blockchain – such as Ethereum [12].
Developers can use JavaScript, Python, or the Solidity pro-
gramming language [31] to create a contract in Ethereum.
This platform also requires payments in the form of gas for
deploying a smart contract, or for executing transactions
that change Blockchain state. Gas is a unit measuring the
amount of computational effort required to execute particular
operations in smart contracts, i.e. it is an internal currency in
Ethereum to pay for transaction fees. Gas is paid in ether –
a cryptocurrency in Ethereum that allows smart contracts to
be executed. Although the amount of gas used for activating
a transaction may be high, its translation to ether unit is
very low. For instance, if the consumed gas of a transaction
is 10000, the transaction fee is approx. 0.0002 (ETH) [7].
Ether motivates miners to validate blocks in the Ethereum
Blockchain, as the successful miner is awarded ether units for
each validation. Additional details about gas consumption of
each operation (opcode) can be found in [8].
2.2 Translating GDPR Rules into Pseudo-Code
The idea of verifying GDPR compliance in an automated way
comes from an approach presented in [10], where the authors
identified a number of questions related to legal concerns
around GDPR. These questions relate to data protection and
privacy measures that should be supported by cloud services.
A number of such questions are presented in Fig. 1.
Legal question L1: relates to the sensitivity of user data.
In the GDPR standard, sensitive data consists of information
such as religious or political beliefs, genetic data, biometric
data and health-related data.
Legal question L2: checks if cloud services have a user
authentication mechanism, such as secure login for preventing
unauthorized access to user data.
Legal question L3: verifies the geographical location of a
provider receiving user data (e.g. whether it is in Europe or
not).
Legal question L4: checks for Binding Corporate Rules
(BCR) certification of non-European data receivers. The BCR
is a code of conduct adopted by a community of multinational
3• L1: Does your service deal with sensitive personal data?
• L2: Does your service support encryption or authentication access for the customer data?
• L3: Does your service give the choice of EU-based migration of personal data?
• L4: Has your underlying connected provider been certified for their Binding Corporate Rules
(BCR) clauses by a EU DPA?
…
Fig. 1. GDPR legal questions.
compliance = true;
if L1 == Yes  then
if L2 == No  then
compliance = false;
return compliance; 
if L3 == No  then
if L4 == No  then
compliance = false;
return compliance;
Fig. 2. Pseudo-code for checking legal compliance.
Read
• L1: Does your service deal with sensitive personal data?
• L2: Does your service support encryption or authentication access for the customer data?
Transfer
• L1: Does your service give the choice of EU-based migration of personal data?
• L2: Has your underlying connected provider been certified for their Binding Corporate Rules
(BCR) clauses by a EU DPA?
Fig. 3. Two typical operations with their legal questions.
companies that want to move user data internationally across
various jurisdictions [10].
To verify provider compliance with GDPR rules as identi-
fied above, pseudo-code was created to support automated
verification [10]. The pseudo-code first categorizes a legal
question into the most relevant GDPR rule(s), followed by
a (“Yes” or “No”) confirmation for each question. Example
of pseudo-code is provided in Fig. 2. For instance, as legal
questions L1 and L2 relate to Art. 32(1)(a) of GDPR, their
verification is interdependent (see Fig. 2). The rule states that
if personal data is sensitive, the service offered to a customer
needs to support encryption or user authentication. L3 and L4
are also considered as related legal questions due to Art. 44–
47 of GDPR restricting the transfer of personal data only to
countries following BCR rules. Smart contracts can benefit
from the pseudo-code description of such rules to translate
legal GDPR compliance rules into operations that can be
verified using monitoring of cloud provider operations.
3 Data Processing and GDPR
A key assumption behind our approach is that activities
carried out by providers (actors) on user data can be classified
into a set of operations that can be monitored, e.g. read,
write, transfer, etc carried out by one or more cloud providers.
For each type of operation, a number of GDPR rules can be
proposed. Subsequently, legal questions such as those in Fig. 1
can be assigned to each operation. Hence each rule can be
associated with a legal clause in GDPR, and represent a legal
question associated with processing of user data. Figure 3
shows an example of such a classification with two operations.
The operation Read is associated with two legal questions L1
and L2 which are related to the GDPR rule for accessing user
data – Art. 32(1)(a). Similarly, operation Transfer can involve
L3 and L4 and focus on the migration of user data outside
Europe – Art. 44–47.
This classification allows the automatic verification of
GDPR rules on actors, by providing a more structured view
for developers to work with. By assigning available GDPR
rules to operations in the form of legal questions, checking
of GDPR compliance for operations in an automatic way
is provided. An operation can have a number of elements –
called as GDPR-concern elements – each of which refers to a
keyword in a GDPR legal question. For instance, the keyword
of the legal question L2 proposed for Read operation is data
encryption.
It is assumed that a function can be implemented progra-
matically for each operation. The GDPR-concern elements
are parameters verified on an operation, and used as a basis
for checking GDPR compliance. The values are provided by
actors and can have binary, textual, or numerical forms. As an
example, the country name of an actor receiving personal data
can be a parameter used to check compliance of the Transfer
operation. As shown in Fig. 2, the if-then clause is used to
verify whether the operation of an actor complies with GDPR,
e.g. if the country of the actor receiving user data is outside
Europe, then the transfer of data is likely to be non-compliant.
Definition 1. Let α be an operation and El = {el1, · · · , eln}
be a set of GDPR-concern elements of α such that eli ∈ El
refers to a keyword or element related to a legal question
proposed for α. The following Boolean-valued function is
defined for the operation α to show its GDPR compliance
status:
Gα :×ni=1Vi 7→ {>,⊥},
where Vi = dom(eli) is the set of values associated with
the domain of eli. The operation α is GDPR compliant, if
Gα(v1, · · · , vn) = >, where vi ∈ Vi.
3.1 Data Usage Model
Service provision may involve a number of actors (providers)
executing a sequence of operations on user data. Operations
may collect or use personal data for realizing the service – the
actual reasons for data collection/ usage is dependent on the
actors involved. We can define a data usage model to formally
represent activities of actors during the life cycle of a service.
Definition 2. The data usage model of a service is a tuple:
M = 〈ACT ,A,D,P〉, where ACT is a set of actors; A is a
set of operations on user data. The set D contains data classes
that are relevant for a user; P ⊆ ACT ×A×D is a data usage
relation set, where each relation determines the data used by
an actor and the operation to be executed on the data.
The set D does not refer to specific data values, it only
specifies the kind of data involved, e.g. user name and address.
GDPR enforces actors to explicitly define their purpose of
data processing, i.e. what operation is carried out by which
actor on what data. Moreover, it encourages actors to inform
users about the GDPR compliance status of their operations
in advance, as defined in GDPR Art. 5 and Art. 30(1)(b). The
following definition formally expresses the purpose of data
processing.
Definition 3. Let M = 〈ACT ,A,D,P〉 express a data
usage model. The purpose of data processing is defined by
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Fig. 4. A GDPR-based architecture for data privacy using Blockchain.
a relation set P , referred to as purpose relation set, such that
P ⊆ ACT × A × D × {>,⊥}, where the set {>,⊥} denotes
the GDPR compliance status of operations. Each relation
specifies the type of operation to be executed by an actor,
the data on which this operation is performed, and the GDPR
compliance status of the operation.
Assuming that an operation α ∈ A of an actor act ∈ ACT
has the set of GDPR-concern elements El = {el1, · · · , eln}
and Gα(v1, · · · , vn) = >, where vi ∈ dom(eli). The purpose
relation 〈act, α, d,>〉 ∈ P states that the actor will execute α
on user data d ⊆ D and that α is GDPR compliant. Hence,
such a relation provides a more transparent mechanism for
verifying actor behaviour and their reasons for collecting/
processing personal user data.
4 A Blockchain-based Architecture
Figure 4 shows an architecture for supporting GDPR compli-
ance checking in a cloud system. It enables the development
of an audit trail of actors (with the roles of controllers or
processors) by using a Blockchain that records the operations
executed by actors on user data. Moreover, the architecture
can be used to verify whether the executed operations com-
ply with GDPR rules (or not). The main components of
the architecture are: a Blockchain-based virtual machine, a
GDPR contract factory and a contract activator. The entities
interacting with the components are: data subject, actors and
verifier.
4.1 Blockchain-based Virtual Machine
A Blockchain platform such as an Ethereum Virtual Machine
(EVM) [12] provides an environment for actors to deploy
smart contracts and build a Blockchain. The virtual machine
also enables compilation, execution and debugging of smart
contracts.
4.2 GDPR Contract Factory
The GDPR Contract Factory contains four smart contracts
that provide the basis for the verification of actor operations
with respect to a set of GDPR rules. The smart contracts are:
GDPR compliance contract, user consent contract, container
contract, and verification contract. Figure 5 shows an archi-
tectural overview of the smart contracts.
GDPR compliance contract
...Function G a_1()
Input:
act, a_1, d, v_1,...,v_k
Output:
act, a_1, d, T/F
Function G a_n()
Input:
act, a_n, d, v_1,...,v_m
Output:
act, a_n, d, T/F
User consent contract
Function Retrieve()
Input:
GDPR compliance add
Output:
block add
Function Vote()
Input:
block add
Output:
vote (T/F)
Container contract
Function Log()
Input:
act, a_i, d
Output:
act, a_i, d
Function Attestation()
Input:
user add
Output:
block add
Verification contract
Function Verify()
Input:
block adds
Output:
V, V',V"
Call
Call
Call
Fig. 5. Abstract model of smart contracts.
GDPR compliance contract captures information required
by a data subject before actors can access personal data. The
contract implements a number of functions, enabling actors
to specify their purpose(s) of data processing. Each function,
implemented for a specific operation (i.e. Gα(v1, · · · , vn)),
processes its inputs (i.e. the values of GDPR-concern ele-
ments) based on a set of terms proposed for verifying GDPR
rules and determines the GDPR compliance status of the
operation (for more details see Section 6).1 Providing a
compliance status can help a user make a more informed
decision about accepting or rejecting a data processing re-
quest. Based on Def. 3, the contract also requires an actor to
submit information about the ‘purpose relation’ set P into the
Blockchain. Each submitted record, specifying the purpose of
data processing, contains: (i) the address of actor act ∈ ACT ,
(ii) the operation α ∈ A that will be executed by the actor,
(iii) the personal data d ⊆ D required for the operation, (iv)
the GDPR compliance status of the operation (> or ⊥). The
contract meets the Art. 30(1)(b) of GDPR under which the
purpose of data processing and the address of an actor must
be determined in advance. Note that the actor’s address can
be a Blockchain wallet ID (e.g. an Ethereum account).
User consent contract contains two functions: Retrieve and
Vote. The Retrieve function uses the address of a GDPR
compliance contract to provide a data subject information
recorded by an actor in the Blockchain, namely: actor ID,
next operation, required data, and GDPR compliance status
of the operation. The Vote function in Fig. 5 submits a data
subject’s votes (positive/negative consent) to the Blockchain.
This contract realizes Art. 6(1)(a) of GDPR, whereby a data
subject must give consent for processing of their personal
data. Formally, the following function defines the vote of a
data subject for accepting or rejecting the purpose of data
processing.
Definition 4. Let P ⊆ ACT ×A×D×{>,⊥} be the purpose
relation set. The vote (positive or negative consent) of data
subject j for the purpose of data processing is denoted by a
Boolean function: Γj : P 7→ {>,⊥}.
Given a relation set γ = 〈act, α, d,>〉 ∈ P , a consent has
been given by the data subject if Γj(γ) = >.
Container contract is used for recording all operations
performed by actors (service providers) on personal data
1. The functions in the GDPR compliance contract are activated by
actors requesting personal user data. The activation of these functions
is recorded in the Blockchain.
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with these operations is submitted to a Blockchain. The
assumption is that a trustable container is launched on the
cloud provider to track these operations on personal data.
A trustable container has the following properties: (i) it can
record operations carried out on data hosted in the container
using a monitoring tool, (ii) the log generated by the mon-
itoring tool cannot be modified by the cloud provider on
which the container is hosted – as described in the VMIn-
formant system [24]. Trustable containers can be realised
in a number of ways – e.g. using Virtual Trusted Platform
Modules (vTPM) [25] and Intel Software Guard Extensions
(SGX) [26] that protect containers from an untrusted host.
These approaches make use of trusted hardware to protect
containers from side channel attacks initiated by the hosting
platform. Trustable containers can also utilise inter-container
protection mechanisms to improve security, e.g. the approach
proposed in [27] protects containers from other malicious
containers on the same host. Co-hosting a malicious Virtual
Machine (VM) on the same physical host as the intended
target VM has been a traditional approach adopted in cloud
systems in the past. In [28], a container-specific security profile
is presented, enabling operations on each container to be
managed separately. Encryption of containers has also been
undertaken in Docker, where a password, Secure Shell (SSH)
private key, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) certificate etc is used
to coordinate data access, limiting what can be visible within
particular containers. Using this approach, encrypted data
can be transferred across the network, and only containers
that have the password (referred to as the “secret”) are able
to see the data. Another use case for using secrets is to
provide a layer of abstraction between the container and a
set of credentials – e.g. when separating credentials for pro-
duction vs. test environments. Kubernetes, another popular
container management framework, also supports encryption
of data when stored within a container. In general therefore, a
trustable container in the context of this work is one which: (i)
is able to record operations carried out on data hosted within
the container – using, for instance, introspection techniques
as reported in VMInformant [24], and which does not require
monitoring from the hosting platform; (ii) supports encryp-
tion of data hosted within the container.
The Container contract has a function, called Log, that
is activated by the container. This function collects informa-
tion about operations carried out in the container, thereby
supporting a subset of the data usage relation set P ′ ⊆ P
described in Def. 2, and submits it into the Blockchain. Such
information includes the address of the actor (cloud provider)
act involved, the executed operation α, and the data d that
has been processed. The Container contract also provides an
Attestation function which informs the data subject where
their personal data is being processed. By running this func-
tion a data subject can be informed about the history of
data movement between different actors involved in a service
provision. The presence of such function meets Art. 15(2)
and 20(2) of GDPR.
Verification contract uses the Verify function to confirm
whether user consent has been obtained. Verification is carried
out using transaction log in a Blockchain.
Definition 5. Let P ′ ⊆ P be a subset of data usage re-
lation set formed through the Container contract and P ′ =
{〈act, α, d〉 | 〈act, α, d, 〉 ∈ P ∧ Γj(〈act, α, d, 〉) =>} be a
relation set derived from the records submitted by the GDPR
compliance contract and which has received user consent. A
violation in Art. 6(1)(a) of GDPR can be flagged (i.e. the rule
legislated for data subject consent) if P ′ 6⊆ P ′.
Given this definition, the Verify function detects possible
violations through Algorithm 1. Actors who violate GDPR
rules are classified into three groups: high-risk, medium-risk,
and low-risk. High-risk actors are denoted by V in Algo-
rithm 1, i.e. operations are not GDPR compliant and have not
received user consent. Medium-risk actors are denoted by V ′
and execute GDPR compliant operations, but the executions
have not been accepted by a data subject. Low-risk actors
are denoted by V ′′ and refer to those who have obtained user
consent but their operations are not GDPR compliant.
Algorithm 1 The verification of actors
Let V be a set of high-risk actors
Let V ′ be a set of medium-risk actors
Let V ′′ be a set of low-risk actors
Input: Actor addresses in a Blockchain
Output: V,V ′,V ′′
1: function Verify
2: V,V ′,V ′′ ← ∅;
3: if P ′ 6⊆ P ′ then
4: V ← V ∪ {act | 〈act, α, d〉 ∈ (P ′ \ P ′) ∧
〈act, α, d,⊥〉 ∈ P}
5: V ′ ← V ′ ∪ {act | 〈act, α, d〉 ∈ (P ′ \ P ′) ∧
〈act, α, d,>〉 ∈ P}
6: else
7: V ′′ ← V ′′ ∪ {act | 〈act, α, d〉 ∈ P ′ ∧
〈act, α, d,⊥〉 ∈ P}
8: return V,V ′,V ′′;
Definition 6. Let α, α′ ∈ A be two operations that have the
same type, and an actor act executes α prior to α′ (α  α′) in
sequence, as part of a service execution. Moreover, let d ⊆ D
and d′ ⊆ D be the set of personal data requested by α and
α′, respectively. The operation α′ is defined as data-neutral if
d′ ⊆ d.
When an operation is data-neutral, details of personal
data used do not need to be stored in a Blockchain. This can
lead to a reduction in the verification costs (see Section 7.3).
4.3 Contract Activator
A Contract Activator is the coordinator responsible for de-
ploying smart contracts, and identifies the deployment ad-
dresses of the data subject, actors involved in processing the
data, and the verifier.
5 Architecture: Compliance Checking Phases
In our architecture, GDPR compliance checking is divided
into three phases: ratification, submission and verification.
The overall coordination is undertaken via the Contract Acti-
vator.
5.1 Ratification Phase
This phase requires a data subject to accept/ reject the main
purpose of data processing. The sequence diagram in Fig. 6
6activate function Gα()
deploy user consent
activate Vote()
record:Γj(〈act, α, d,>/⊥〉)
result:accept>/reject⊥
check block
activate Retrieve()
contract, block addr.
enforcement
record:〈act, α, d,>/⊥〉
contract address
deploy GDPR compliance
personal data usage
a:Data subject b:Contract activator c:Actor d:Blockchain
Fig. 6. Interactions in ratification phase.
process personal datadeployment address
termination
record:〈act, α, d〉
activate Log()
deploy container cont. launch a container
activate Attestation()
check block
deployment address
data usage permission
a:Data subject b:Contract activator c:Actor d:Blockchain
Fig. 7. Interactions in submission phase.
shows the interactions for reaching an agreement between a
data subject and an actor. First, an actor sends a message
to a Contract Activator for accessing personal user data. The
Contract Activator deploys GDPR compliance contract and
gives the address of contract deployment to the actor. Using
this address, an actor can access the contract and execute
function (Gα) based on its purpose of data processing. Once
the function is activated, the record forming purpose of data
processing (〈act, α, d,>/⊥〉) is submitted to a Blockchain.
The actor then sends a message to Contract Activator to get
the vote of a data subject (Γj(〈act, α, d,>/⊥〉)) for the data
processing purpose. The Contract Activator deploys a user
consent contract and sends the deployment address to a data
subject. This address can then be used by the data subject
and verified using the Blockchain. The vote of a data subject
stored in the Blockchain is accessible for the verification phase.
Data subject also notifies Contract Activator about the vote
result (accept >/reject ⊥).
5.2 Submission Phase
This phase records all the information related to the data
usage relation set. The interaction between the Contract
Activator and an actor for storing such records in a Blockchain
is represented by the sequence diagram in Fig. 7. When a data
subject confirms the execution of an operation in the previous
phase, the Contract Activator sends an acceptance message
activate Verify()
record: V ,V ′,V ′′
examine output
verification result
deployment address
deploy verification contract
a:Contract activator b:Verifier c:Blockchain
Fig. 8. Interactions in verification phase.
to the actor to access or process personal data. A container
is launched on the actor to track operations carried out by
the actor on user data. The Contract Activator also deploys a
container contract and sends the contract deployment address
to the actor – followed by an activation of the Log function to
record 〈act, α, d〉. Logging stores the actor address, executed
operation and the processed personal data – and subsequently
forwarded to a Blockchain. The actor then submits a ter-
mination message to the Contract Activator to notify the
finalization of data processing. The deployment address of
the container contract is then sent to the data subject to
individually track activities of actors (achieved through the
Attestation function supplied by the container contract).
5.3 Verification Phase
This phase verifies data submitted to the Blockchain in pre-
vious phases. It detects any violation in GDPR rule(s) that
forbids actors to process personal data without the consent
of a data subject (Art. 6(1)(a)). The sequence diagram illus-
trated in Fig. 8 shows the protocol used for this phase. First,
the Contract Activator deploys the verification contract and
provides the verifier with the address of contract deployment.
The verifier then executes the Verify function (Algorithm 1)
to retrieve blocks created in previous phases. The outputs of
the function are addresses of actors violating GDPR rules or
executing non-compliant operations (V,V ′,V ′′) and recorded
in a Blockchain for future reference. Finally, the verifier no-
tifies the contract activator of any actors found to violating
GDPR rules.
6 Use Case: Cloud-based Pharmacy
Consider an online pharmacy service hosted at a cloud data
center, such as one offered by dincloud [13]. The service re-
ceives patient prescription requests, checks the availability of
medicines, and prepares an invoice for the patient. The service
also maintains an electronic health record (EHR) system to
store useful information about the medical status of patients.
The provider of pharmacy service has two subcontractors, a
payment and a shipping service provider, in order to handle
the payment and delivery of medicines. Figure 9 illustrates an
example of a typical cloud-based pharmacy business process
comprising of the providers’ activities. The payment service
provider offers two optional services: western union and pay-
pal to manage the payment process. In case the transfer of
money is successful, a receipt is issued and sent to the patient.
7Fig. 9. Business process of online pharmacy and its subcontractors.
The shipping service provider carries out, in parallel, the pro-
cesses of packing and delivery of medicines and the automated
profiling of customer data. It also performs analysis on its
customers’ personal data to publish several statistical results
about the number of parcels sent to a specific region during
a period of time. Such information can be used to improve
delivery services and to reduce the time to fulfill an order.
Finally, the provider sends the customer a reference number
for tracking their parcel. There is a constraint in the shipping
business process emphasizing the minimal time for delivery of
packets (within three days). Each provider requires patients
to provide personal data to offer its service. The purposes of
data processing for each provider is described below.
Pharmacy service provider requires the following patient
data: name, address details, age, general practitioner (GP)
diagnosis, electronic version of prescription, and bank account
details. It provides the payment service provider personal
data including name and bank account details. It also sends
the name, age and address details of the patient to the
shipping service provider to deliver medicines. The provider
maintains the medical information of patients to provide a
comprehensive understanding of patients’ records for health-
care professionals.
Payment service provider needs the following data: bank
account details, provided by the pharmacy service provider to
organize the payment process and to transfer money.
Shipping service provider receives the personal data pro-
vided by the pharmacy service provider to manage the ship-
ping of medicines. Furthermore, it runs a profiling operation
on the destination addresses of its customers to obtain and
publish statistics (such as time taken to deliver to a particular
address, number of successful/ unsuccessful requests, etc).
Read
• L1: Does your service deal with sensitive personal data?
• L2: Does your service support encryption or authentication access for the customer data?
Write
• L1: Does your service enable customers delete their data in the original used service?
• L2: How long will the personal data be stored?
• L3: How long is it necessary for processing personal data through your service?
Profiling
• L1: Does your service avoid automated profiling on the personal data of customer who is under 18?
• L2: Does your service deal with profiling of sensitive personal data?
Transfer
• L1: Does your service give the choice of EU-based migration of personal data?
• L2: Has your underlying connected provider been certified for their Binding Corporate Rules (BCR)
clauses by a EU DPA?
Fig. 10. GDPR legal questions related to each operation.
Regarding the roles defined in GDPR, both payment and
shipping service providers are expected to be data processors
and directly handle or process personal data. The pharmacy
service provider, however, can have the roles of data processor
and data controller. It plays the role of a processor when
personal data is used for managing and generating the pre-
scription. It plays the role of a controller when personal data
is transferred to subcontractors (i.e. other providers).
The operations of these providers on personal data are
expressed by typical operations: read, write, profiling, and
transfer. Specifically, the operations of pharmacy, payment
and shipping providers are: (read, write, transfer), read and
(read, profiling) respectively.
Assuming that act1, act2, and act3 are pharmacy, pay-
ment, and shipping service providers, respectively. The data
8usage model of the online pharmacy service with respect to
Def. 2 is described as follows.
ACT = {act1, act2, act3}
A = {read, transfer, profiling, store}
D = {name, age, address, GP diagnosis,
prescription, bank account}
P = {· · · , 〈act3, read, {name, age, address}〉,
〈act3, profiling, {name, age, address}〉, · · · }
Set P is used for the shipping service to provide an illustrative
example and to simplify the description of this set. The actual
set can contain a number of additional activities. Given the
aforementioned operations, Fig. 10 demonstrates the GDPR
legal questions assigned to each of them.
Read: Art. 32(1)(a) of GDPR requires actors who read or
access sensitive personal data to have an encryption or au-
thentication control mechanism for preventing unauthorized
access to data. Two legal questions can be associated with
this operation: (i) whether personal data is sensitive or not;
(ii) types of mechanisms used for the protection of sensitive
personal data [23]. For instance, the GP diagnosis and pre-
scription that are requested by pharmacy service providers
can be considered as sensitive data.
Write: Art. 17 of GDPR requires actors who write or store
personal data to have a capability for their customers to erase
their personal data at anytime. Moreover, Art. 5(1)(e) of
GDPR does not allow actors to store personal data longer
than the time necessary for data processing. The first legal
question is related to Art. 17. The two last questions are based
on Art. 5(1)(e).
Profiling: Art. 22 of GDPR states that any automated
profiling operation on customers under 18, or whose per-
sonal data are in the category of sensitive data, needs to
be pre-confirmed. The first legal question relates to analysis
operations (e.g. prediction/ forecasting) on personal data of
customers who are underage. The second asks actors whether
their service deals with profiling of sensitive data or not.
Transfer: Art. 44–47 of GDPR restricts the transfer of
personal data outside Europe or outside countries holding
Binding Corporate Rules (BCR) certifications [23]. The first
and second legal questions are, respectively, related to the
geographical location of actors receiving personal data and
the BCR status of the data receiver.
6.1 Ratification Phase Business Process
Figure 11 represents the business process in which an actor
identifies operations to be executed on personal data, and the
data subject gives positive or negative consent. For each type
of operation selected by an actor in the GDPR compliance
contract, the status of GDPR compliance is automatically
checked with respect to the information (inputs) provided by
the actor. This status along with the required personal data –
referred to as output – are subsequently sent to a Blockchain
network. In the user consent contract, a data subject can
retrieve blocks containing the data (output) recorded by the
GDPR compliance contract and provide their vote.
In the business process of the cloud-based pharmacy, the
pattern (Fig. 11) can be added as a sub-process just before
requesting personal data, at the beginning of the process in
all service providers.
6.1.1 Verification Operations
The verification of the aforementioned GDPR rules over oper-
ations is performed in this phase. As depicted in Fig. 11, the
GDPR compliance contract defines a function for each opera-
tion which is activated by an actor. Assuming that compliance
is a Boolean variable, its value shows whether the execution
of an operation will comply with its designated GDPR rules
or not. For each type of operation, its function outputs are:
the value of GDPR compliance status (compliance) together
with the actor address and the processed personal data. The
outputs are recorded in a Blockchain to support verification
of actors in the next phases.
Gread(): Let act ∈ ACT and d ⊆ D be, respectively, actor
address and the set of personal data that must be processed
by the actor. Moreover, let encrypt be the GDPR-concern
element of the read operation. The value of encrypt is Boolean
and shows whether the service provided by the actor supports
encryption of user data or not (declared by encrypt is “true”).
Algorithm 2 Read operation
Input: act, d, encrypt
Output: act, d, compliance
1: function Gread
2: compliance = true;
3: if encrypt == false then
4: compliance = false;
5: return(act, d, compliance);
From Algorithm 2, if the value of encrypt is “false”, the
operation violates the GDPR rule legislated in Art. 32(1)(a).
In the cloud-based pharmacy, all service providers can activate
the function, since each requires access to personal data of a
user.2
Gwrite(): Let act ∈ ACT and d ⊆ D be, respectively, actor
address and required personal data. Moreover, let Tt, Ts, and
erase be the GDPR-concern elements of the operation. The
value of Tt shows the total time taken for data processing
and the value of Ts represents the period of time over which
personal data will be stored at the actor. The Boolean variable
erase determines whether an actor enables customers to erase
their data at any time. For example, if the value is “true” then
the actor has an option for customers to delete their data from
the local storage of the actor.
Algorithm 3 Write operation
Input: act, d, erase, Tt, Ts
Output: act, d, compliance
1: function Gwrite
2: compliance = true;
3: if erase == false or Tt < Ts then
4: compliance = false;
5: return(act, d, compliance);
As outlined in Algorithm 3, the execution of write oper-
ation complies with GDPR if erase is “true” and Ts ≤ Tt.
In the cloud-based pharmacy, the function is activated by
the online pharmacy service provider as the provider stores
patient records.
2. The function also gets actor address and processed data, since
they should directly be sent into a Blockchain to specify the purpose
of data processing.
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Gprofiling(): Let act ∈ ACT and d ⊆ D be, respectively,
actor address and the personal data that must be processed.
Moreover, let sensitive and isadult be the GDPR-concern
elements of the operation that can have Boolean values. The
value of sensitive shows whether sensitive data are profiled.
The value of isadult determines whether the actor performs
only profiling operation on adult customers or not (e.g. its
“true” value denotes the data profiling of adults).
Algorithm 4 Profiling operation
Input: act, d, isadult, sensitive
Output: act, d, compliance
1: function Gprofiling
2: compliance = true;
3: if isadult == false or sensitive == true then
4: compliance = false;
5: return(act, d, compliance);
The profile operation in Algorithm 4 violates GDPR rule
(Art. 22) if sensitive is “true” or isadult is “false”. In the
cloud-based pharmacy scenario, the function is only activated
by the shipping service provider.
Gtransfer(): Let act ∈ ACT and d ⊆ D be, respectively, actor
address and the personal data that must be transferred. More-
over, let loc be the GDPR-concern element of the operation
containing the country name of the data receiver. Assuming
that BCR is a set containing the list of countries holding BCR
certification, and EU is a set involving the names of European
countries.
Algorithm 5 Transfer operation
Input: act, d, loc
Output: act, d, compliance
1: function Gtransfer
2: compliance = true;
3: if loc /∈ EU then
4: if loc /∈ BCR then
5: compliance = false;
6: return(act, d, compliance);
As seen from Algorithm 5, if personal data is sent outside
Europe and the country of data receiver has not been certified
by BCR, the value of compliance is “false”. This function
should be activated by the online pharmacy service provider,
as it transfers personal data to both payment and shipping
service providers.
6.2 Submission Phase Business Process
Figure 12 describes a design pattern for the submission phase.
When a container is launched, it checks all the activities of the
actor on personal data. After the execution of an operation,
the address of the actor (act), the name of the operation (α)
and the processed personal data (d) are collected and sent to
the Blockchain through the container contract. In the online
pharmacy business process, the pattern (Fig. 12) can be added
as a sub-process after requesting and storing personal data
at the actor. In the payment business process, the pattern is
added as a sub-process just after asking for personal data. In
the shipping business process, the pattern is represented as a
sub-process after demanding personal data and also just after
analysing/ profiling the data.
6.3 Verification Phase Business Process
Figure 13 shows the business process through which the
verification of operations performed by the actors is carried
out. Executing the verify function leads to records with user
consent, GDPR compliance and container contracts being re-
trieved from the Blockchain. After checking these records, any
violating actors can be reported as described in Algorithm 1.
The verifier can give a vote to such a report and the vote is
stored in the Blockchain for future reference. Notably, the sub-
process handle delay is required to notify the verifier about
any violation or breaches before 72 hours – as referred to in
Art. 33 of GDPR. Due to our Blockchain-based technique,
the duty of notifying violations is, however, delegated to the
verifier instead of other actors involved in service provision.
After completing the procedures presented in the cloud-
based pharmacy business processors, the pattern depicted in
Fig. 13 can be executed through the verifier.
7 Experimental Results
A prototype was developed using the Ganache [29] and
Ropsten [30] networks. We implemented our proposed smart
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Fig. 12. Business process of submission phase.
Fig. 13. Business process of verification phase.
contracts on Ethereum using Solidity. The Ganache local test
network supplied default gas and ether values that can be
used as a currency to alter Blockchain states when executing
particular function calls. Ropsten is a public test environment
containing a number of miners (and provides detailed infor-
mation of these miners) and has a gas limit of 4712388 for
deploying a contract. The smart contracts were written with a
minimum gas consumption for each function execution. They
were tested using Remix, which is a Web-based development
environment for Solidity running the deployed contracts. The
smart contracts User consent, GDPR compliance, Container
and Verification were deployed in both the Ganache and Rop-
sten networks. The amount of gas used for contract deploy-
ment in both networks was 1156961 for User consent, 1494786
for GDPR compliance, 527497 for Container, and 1246963
for Verification. These results show the computational cost
of executing each contract. The amount of gas consumed is
influenced by the number of actors, and the transaction fees
paid for the execution of operations by each actor. The impact
of changing the number of actors on the average time taken for
the mining process of verification contract is also evaluated.
We also investigate the relationship between user payment
and GDPR violation detection rate under different scales of
operations. The outcome of these experiments can be used
to identify the computational capacity needed to support a
GDPR-compliance checking system. The more complex the
contract, the greater the gas consumption.
7.1 Number of Actors and Gas Consumption
This experiment involves changing the number of actors and
evaluates the amount of gas used for the execution of functions
in the ratification, submission and verification phases. The
number of actors is varied from one, five and ten so that each
actor executes an operation randomly selected between read,
write, profiling and transfer. Moreover, the number of personal
data items requested for each operation is randomly changed
between one and ten for each execution. Our proposed smart
contracts were deployed in the Ganache test network and
each function was executed with different parameters, and
activated ten times to calculate the average used gas results.
Table 1 provides the results of this experiment. When the
number of actors (or operations) increases, the amount of
consumed gas increases sharply. Since the number of functions
or transactions in the ratification phase is more than the other
phases, much more should be paid for the execution of this
phase compared to the submission and verification phases.
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TABLE 1
The relationship between number of actors and used gas
Actors Consumed gas Gas cost (gwei) Gas cost (USD)
R
at
ifi
ca
tio
n 1 375190 1125570 $0.3
5 1482783 4448349 $1.19
10 2932177 8796531 $2.36
Su
bm
is
si
on 1 165804 497412 $0.13
5 729860 2189580 $0.59
10 1669356 5008068 $1.34
Ve
ri
fic
at
io
n 1 63952 191856 $0.05
5 282896 848688 $0.23
10 568885 1706655 $0.46
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Fig. 14. The relationship between cost and violation detection rate.
The gas price unit is in gwei, being 1× 10−9 ether. The price
is 3 gwei in the experiment and gas cost is calculated as:
consumed gas × gas price. As seen from the table, although
the calculated gas costs in gwei is high, its translation to USD
is very low.
7.2 Transaction Fee and Violation Detection Rate
This evaluation involves changing the number of operations
used, and investigates the relationship between the cost paid
by a user for verifying operations and the number of violations
detected. The assumption is that we have only one actor and
the number of operations executed by an actor varies from
five to ten. The number of personal data items required for
each operation is randomly selected between one and ten. A
gas price of 3 gwei is assumed in the experiment. We used the
Ganache test network for deploying smart contracts and ac-
tivating functions in these contracts. Figure 14 demonstrates
the test results – with the x-axis showing the cost paid by
a user for identifying a violating actor in the verification
phase. The y-axis indicates the rate of successful violation
detection. Given a specific number of operations and a cost
paid for verifying them, the verify function was activated ten
times. The number of times that the function was successfully
executed is calculated as a detection rate. The experiment
TABLE 2
The relationship between number of data-neutral operations and cost
k Consumed gas Gas cost (gwei) Gas cost (USD)
0 661145 2644582 $0.82
1 655639 2622558 $0.81
2 650142 2600569 $0.80
3 644620 2578481 $0.79
4 639150 2556601 $0.79
5 633655 2534621 $0.78
shows that when the number of operations is five and a user
can pay $0.35 for the verification of operations, the verify
function is successfully activated even if the operations deal
with a maximum number of personal data items (ten in
this instance). As illustrated in the figure, there is a direct
relationship between the fee paid by a data subject and the
rate of violation detection. Moreover, for a given price, when
the number of operations increases, the violation detection
rate decreases. For example, a violation cannot be detected
when the number of operations is ten and our budget is $0.45.
7.3 Effect of Data-Neutral Operations on Verification Fee
This experiment evaluates the impact of the number of data-
neutral operations on the gas consumed for the verification.
We assume that we have one actor executing ten operations
on user data. Each operation requests a number of personal
data items, selected randomly between one and ten. We used
Ganache for deploying smart contracts and executing their
functions. The gas price was 4 gwei in the experiment. Table 2
represents the details of test results, where the values are
approximate. The number of data-neutral operations k varies
from 0 to 5. We calculated the average gas used by the
verify function after five executions of smart contracts. As
observed from the table, when the number of data-neutral
operations increases, the gas consumption of the function
decreases slightly. For instance, a comparison between k = 0
and k = 5 shows that the cost of the verify function has a
difference of $0.04.
7.4 Number of Actors and Verification Mining Time
This experiment evaluates the relationship between the num-
ber of actors and the mining time taken for their verification.
The number of actors varies from one to ten and each executes
an operation randomly chosen amongst the ones in the case
study. Moreover, the number of personal data asked for is var-
ied between one and ten per execution. We used the Ropsten
test network to get the results of this experiment, as Ropsten
can be used to calculate the time (in seconds) between the
activation to the mining of a transaction. Figure 15 illustrates
the time for the verify function to be successfully mined, from
its initial activation time. In fact, the smart contracts were
executed five times to calculate the average mining time of the
verify function. As seen from the figure, this time fluctuates
when we change the number of actors, and is (primarily)
influenced by the interest of miners in executing the verify
function. It does not depend on the number of actors or the
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Fig. 15. The relationship between mining time and actors.
function parameters. As a result, the miners can usually take
an arbitrary time for the mining process.
8 Related Work
The challenge of user trust and privacy for sharing data in a
cloud ecosystem has recently motivated cloud researchers to
find a solution based on smart contracts and Blockchain-based
techniques. A Blockchain-based data sharing framework was
presented to provide privacy for recording medical data within
cloud environments [37]. The framework was based on a
lightweight and permissioned Blockchain giving access rights
to only verified users. The potential of using Blockchain-
based techniques in order to protect healthcare data located
in cloud was extensively studied in [32]. The authors described
practical challenges to highlight the importance of privacy in
recording medical data in a Blockchain network. The authors
in [33] presented a patient centric healthcare data manage-
ment system with the aid of a Blockchain network. The
system ensures that private healthcare data in a cloud system
is only accessible by a patient. An approach for building a
public ledger for supporting policy compliance was proposed
in [34]. The approach introduced an off-chain channel to
provide the verification of external parties to the information
stored in a Blockchain. In [11], a Blockchain-based approach
was proposed for storing cloud attestation. The authors im-
plemented a smart contract for recording the migration of
user data between cloud providers. The deployment of the
smart contract enabled cloud users to be informed about the
location of their data through the submission of a query to the
contract. In [39], the same authors extended a smart contract
implemented in [11] to provide cloud users more control on
the migration of their data so that data can only be shared
between providers existing in a users’ white list. In [39], the
trust of cloud customers was improved by improving visibility
of data movement policies for users, which was realized using a
Blockchain-based technique [35]. The authors in [38] proposed
an automatic way for tracking and enforcing data sharing
agreements between a user and cloud providers with the aid of
smart contracts and a Blockchain network. In this approach,
the providers who violated the shared agreements were de-
tected through a set of voters or arbiters listed in a voting
contract. In [36], a secure smart home architecture based on
cloud and Blockchain technology was proposed. The authors
used an encryption and hashing algorithm in Blockchain
technology to obtain confidentiality and trust in smart home
networks. The integration of Blockchain-based approaches
with several security services, including authentication, pri-
vacy, data provenance and integrity has been reviewed in [9].
Given some recent approaches in the data provenance domain,
a conceptual model—called ProvChain—was designed to col-
lect cloud data provenance and provide assurance for data
operations in a cloud. This was achieved by analysing the
provenance log stored in a Blockchain network [40]. Although
the aforementioned approaches take advantage of Blockchain
and smart contracts to enhance cloud user privacy and trust,
none of them focus on GDPR rule violation. There is also
limited support provided in existing approaches for mapping
data privacy legislation into automated rules that can be
verified through cloud provider monitoring logs.
Looking at recent contributions that benefit from combin-
ing both Blockchain and GDPR, in [17], a Blockchain-based
approach for supporting data accountability and provenance
tracking, which meets GDPR requirements, was proposed.
The approach presented two different models for deploying
a smart contract in a Blockchain network. The first model
used data subject consent rules in a Blockchain under which
each actor (controller/ processor) should follow the rules. The
second model deployed actor policies as a smart contract
in a Blockchain that allows users as subscribers to join or
leave the contract. However, the verification of Blockchain
to check whether actors violated consent rules was manually
undertaken by a user in both models. Moreover, a combination
model to enable negotiation between a data subject and an
actor for reaching a shared agreement was not studied in [17].
A personal health data sharing system has been proposed
in [41], which enabled users to securely share their health
data and help data consumers to get necessary data in a
transparent manner and in compliance with GDPR. The
system used Blockchain technology supplemented by cloud
storage to share the health data. Likewise, a data quality
inspection module relied on machine learning approaches was
introduced in the system to monitor the quality of personal
health data. Although the system benefits from GDPR and
Blockchain for improving the privacy of users’ health data, it
still lacks a methodology whereby the verification of stored
data in the Blockchain network is supported. The authors
in [19] designed a conceptual and a high level architecture
for an identity management system that provides control on
personal data usage with the aid of GDPR. The architecture
also utilized Blockchain technology to supply transparency,
trust, and security. However, the validation and deployment
of architecture in real-world applications was not discussed.
A Blockchain-based personally identifiable information man-
agement system, called BcPIIMS, was proposed in [20] so
that storing personal data in the system complied with a
GDPR rule. Though, the management system has not yet
implemented in practice. Furthermore, the verification of
GDPR rules on the system was only limited to the rule:
right to be forgotten. The authors in [21] took advantages
of Blockchain and GDPR to develop a digital onboarding
framework that defines some security policies for users’ iden-
tity attributes stored on multiple centralized repositories.
However, the automatic verification of GDPR rules over the
framework was not studied. In [23], a privacy-aware cloud
architecture making use of GDPR and Blockchain was de-
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signed to enhance transparency and enable the audit trail
of providers who accessed user data. Though, the GDPR
rules legislated for user consent and data storage were not
examined and the notions of data usage and purpose of data
processing were not formally defined. Moreover, the validation
of the architecture and the transaction costs of its smart
contracts were not investigated. In [42], a semantic model was
proposed through which Blockchain and smart contract were
used to check a data subject’s consent over the activities of
data processors. GDPR compliance checking of the model,
however, was only limited to consent requirements of a data
subject, and integration of the model in cloud environment
was not discussed. The authors in [43] analysed GDPR con-
cerns that should be considered (in various applications) using
a Blockchain network to track activities of data processing
actors on personal data. A practical solution for the automatic
verification of GDPR rules, however, was not examined in this
approach. A GDPR-compliant data management platform
using a Blockchain network was proposed in [44]. The plat-
form provided a decentralised mechanism for cloud providers
and their customers to process personal data and improve
data provenance with the aid of a Blockchain. However, the
platform only verified GDPR rules related to user consent.
The cost of data storage and computational requirements used
in the verification process were not evaluated in this work.
9 Conclusion
This paper enhanced the privacy of cloud users through the
integration of Blockchain and GDPR rules. It provided a foun-
dation for translating GDPR rules into smart contracts that
enabled the verification of cloud providers in an automatic and
transparent way. It formally defined the types of operations
that can be executed on user data, and the purposes of data
processing by providers. This was used to determine what
information should be recorded in the Blockchain network to
facilitate subsequent GDPR-compliance verification. A sys-
tem and functional architecture was designed to show how
cloud users and providers can connect to a Blockchain network
and access smart contracts that can be used for complying
with GDPR. The architecture enabled users to provide pos-
itive (or negative) consent for executing provider operations,
and for recording these operations (and the associated con-
sent outcomes) in a Blockchain network for futher analysis.
Furthermore, the architecture introduced a Blockchain-based
technique that supports both preventative and reactive mech-
anisms to support GDPR compliance checking. The former
allowed only providers to operate on personal data if their
purposes of data processing were already accepted by user.
The latter verified the operations appearing in the purposes
of data processing after their execution on personal data
and reported any provider activity that conflicts with user
consent. An illustrative case study was also presented to
demonstrate how the proposed approach can be used. This
involves a cloud-based pharmacy service that supports four
typical operations carried out by providers on customer data.
For each operation, several GDPR related legal questions
(and related to particular clauses in this regulation) were
assigned to enforce providers to give summarized information
about their services, dealing with personal data. Moreover,
some algorithms were proposed in the case study for verifying
operations with respect to GDPR rules. The case study also
showed how our Blockchain-based approach in forms of sub
business processes can be placed in the main design pat-
tern of cloud-based pharmacy. Finally, our proposed smart
contracts were deployed in both local and global Blockchain
test networks (Ganache and Ropsten) and experiments were
conducted to indicate how much gas is consumed to check
GDPR compliance of provider activities on personal data.
Future work will focus on translating other available
GDPR rules, particularly those legislated for cloud [10], into
smart contracts. Particularly, we will investigate how the
GDPR rule “the right to be forgotten” can be supported
by our proposed technique, since the rule currently has
a conflict with the immutability feature of a Blockchain
network. The implementation of the designed architecture
in a permissioned or private Blockchain such as Hyperledger
Fabric is also another potential research avenue for future
consideration.
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